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STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY WHEN A CORPORATION
ILLEGALLY REDUCES ITS STATED CAPITAL IN
ORDER TO REPURCHASE HIS SHARES
I. INTRODUCTION
When a corporation illegally reduces its stated capital in order to repur-
chase the shares of a stockholder,' substantial unrest results. The remaining
shareholders are disturbed since a part•of their investment has been diverted
to a particular shareholder. Creditors are disturbed since stated capital, which
in theory represents a "cushion" to secure their debts and on which they
had a right to rely,2
 has been "raided!' The imposition of liability on the
selling shareholder is an attempt to remove the unrest by restoring the stated
capital to its originally intact status. A liability statute, however, must do
much more than determine who is entitled to the illegally withdrawn assets.
It should provide a method of deterring individuals from that activity which
may lead to the unrest which the legislature is seeking to avoid.
Even when stated capital is not reduced, the repurchase procedure in
itself can lead to specific dangers.
[M] any abuses are made possible by permitting a corporation
to deal in its own shares. There is no doubt that such power "is
a fruitful source of unfairness, mismanagement and corruption."
The purchase of its own shares may be a method of secret with-
drawal and reduction of current assets to the prejudice of creditors
and holders of prior securities, a method of favoritism to insiders,
or of speculation with corporate funds and the creation of artificial
market prices.'
To minimize these dangers, legislatures often impose very tight controls on
the corporation's dealings in its own securities. 4
 The statute may require
shareholder consent to reduce capital,° or may demand public notification
of the capital reduction.° Many statutes insist that the corporation refrain
from any purchase that might lead to a capital impairment.? Another way
in which the legislature can discourage these dangers is through the imposi-
tion of sanctions on violators of the statutory requirements for repurchase
of shares and reduction of capital. Standards of liability are set out for
the director who consents to the transaction and for the shareholder who
1 This will normally be done by releasing funds from stated capital and thereby
creating a "surplus" with which the corporation makes the repurchase.
2 Kimbrough v. Davies, 104 Miss. 723, 735, 61 So. 697, 698 (1913) ; Whittaker v.
Weller, 8 Wash. 2d 18, 111 P.2d 218 (1941). But see Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties
in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 363, 364 (1958).
a 1 BaIlantine & Sterling, California Corporation Laws 298 (4th ed. 1962), as cited in
England v. Christensen, 243 Cal. App. 2d 478, 488 n.17, 52 Cal. Rptr. 402, 408 n.17
(1966).
4 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25507 (West 1955).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 244(a) (1953).
0
 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:11-5 (1939).
7
 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 160 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.120(2)
(1961) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 3051 (1961).
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is the recipient of the illegal withdrawal of assets. 8 It is upon the latter
liability that this comment will focus.
II. STRICT LIABILITY
The strictest standard of liability under present day corporate codes
is that which requires the shareholder to return what he received regardless
of his knowledge of the illegal processes that led to the distribution to him.
Suppose the shareholder sells his shares on the open market without knowing
the identity of the purchaser or without knowing that his sale was part of a
series of events which led to a capital impairment. Should he be held liable?
An argument in favor of imposing liability in this situation is that it pro-
vides the easiest way to restore all parties to the status quo. When the share-
holder simply returns the proceeds he received in exchange for his shares,
the stated capital is, in effect, restored intact, so that the investment of the
creditors and other shareholders is no longer subject to any greater risk
than they bargained for. It might also be argued that there is a direct
relation between the strictness of the standard of liability and the deterrence
of the evils which the legislature is seeking to avoid; the heavier the standard
of liability imposed, the more likely will the parties be discouraged from
entering the illegal transaction. Before evaluating the soundness of these
arguments, an examination will be made of the strict liability statutes as they
exist today.
In Minnesota, if the corporation uses nonsurplus funds to purchase a
shareholder's shares,° the latter receives an "unlawful distribution" for which
he is individually liable under all circumstances. 1° Several other states im-
pose the same absolute standard." Some legislatures, on the other hand,
while still imposing liability on the shareholder independent of his state of
mind, subject this liability to one or more of the following conditions: (1)
insolvency of the corporation, (2) publication of capital reduction, (3) direc-
tor's primary liability, and (4) director's contribution.
Massachusetts, for example, provides that when a corporation makes
any distribution to a shareholder, whether by way of "purchase of its own
stock or otherwise," the shareholder shall be liable "if the corporation is, or
is thereby rendered, bankrupt or insolvent and if the corporation is there-
after duly adjudicated bankrupt . . . "12 Vermont imposes liability when the
corporation's "capital stock is reduced before the full payment of its debts." 13
Vermont seems to impose a heavier burden on the shareholder, since he is
liable whenever the corporation becomes insolvent in the equity sense, i.e.,
when the corporation is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the
8 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 719 (McKinney 1963); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-44 (1950).
9 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.22(6) (1947) provides for repurchase only out of earned
surplus or paid-in surplus.
10 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.23(1) (1947).
11 E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 36(c) (1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.48
(1948); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-3-29 (1956).
12 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 45 (Supp. 1965). Cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.55
(1956).
13 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 362 (1958). Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-54 (1965).
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usual course of business. The shareholder in Massachusetts, on the other
hand, is not liable until the corporation has been declared insolvent in the
bankruptcy sense.14
Adopting the second condition, Delaware," Kansas," New Jersey,"
New Mexico," and West Virginia" impose strict liability on the share-
holder when no public notification is made by the corporation of the reduc-
tion of capital. Until such notice is given, the creditors are led to believe
"that the capital has not been impaired by payments to stockholders for
their shares."2° The shareholder's ignorance of the source of the payment
or of the corporation's failure to notify will be no defense. 21
The third way in which the shareholder avoids liability is through the
imposition of liability on the director. In Idaho,22 Kentucky,23 and Wash-
ington,24 the director who makes an unlawful distribution to shareholders
"knowingly or without making reasonable inquiry" is liable to the corpora-
tion. Under these statutes, the shareholder will be liable to the corporation
only: first, when no director is liable to the corporation, or second, to the
extent that the corporation is unable to obtain satisfaction after judgments
against directors. Although the same language is found in the Louisiana
statute,25 it is qualified and to a considerable degree nullified by the following
clause:
In any case where the directors are held liable for the sole reason of
having acted negligently, the directors [who are] jointly and sever-
ally liable to the extent of the payments made by them, shall have a
cause and right of action against each of the shareholders for the
proportionate amount of the unlawful . . . distribution received by
such shareholder. 2°
The first two provisions appear to reflect a legislative policy that a director
should be primarily liable for the illegal withdrawal, even if he simply failed
to exercise "that diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men in
like position would exercise under similar conditions." 27 The receiving share-
holder is called upon only if the director cannot pay a judgment, or if the
director acted reasonably under the circumstances. The additional provision
in the Louisiana act, on the other hand, offsets the balance of priorities set
up in the first two sections by giving the negligent director an unconditional
cause of action against the shareholder.
14 See Henn, Corporations § 319, at 487 (1961).
16 Del. Cade Ann. tit. 8, § 244(e) (1953).
16 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-3225 (1949).
17 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:11-5 (1939).
13 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 15-3-18 (1953).
19 W. Va. Code Ann. § 3025(1) (1961).
20 Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87 N.J. Super. 216, 225, 208 A.2d 803, 808 (1965).
21 Id. at 224, 208 A.2d at 808.
22 Idaho Code Ann. § 30-131 (1948).
23 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271.275 (1963).
24 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 23.01.260 (1961).
25 La. Rev. Stat. § 12.27(B) (1950).
26 La. Rev. Stat. § 12.27(C) (1950).
27 La. Rev. Stat. § 12.27(A) (1950).
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Finally, Virginia takes a somewhat different approach and adopts the
fourth alternative condition to shareholder liability. If a director participates
in an illegal distribution of assets to the shareholder and is held liable, he
"shall be entitled to contribution from the stockholders who accepted or
received such . . . assets . . . ."28 • Unlike Louisiana, which gives the director
a cause of action against the shareholder only if the director was negligent
in assenting to the distribution, Virginia gives the director the right to con-
tribution from the shareholder even if the director's actions were in willful
violation of the statute.
The first step which must be taken in an attempt to evaluate the strict
liability statutes is to determine whether a creditor is entitled to the abso-
lute protection which such statutes provide. Should the shareholder be forced
to return the assets he received in order to restore the stated capital, regard-
less of his state of mind? The affirmative answer contained in the statutes
noted above is subject to question, since it fails to take into account what the
nature of the creditor's risk should be. The rationale behind the notification
statutes29
 and the statutes against the impairment of capitaI 3° is that the
creditor has a legal right to rely on the status of the stated capital at the
time he extends credit to the corporation. It can be extremely difficult to de-
termine when the distribution of assets has reached a point of capital reduc-
tion.31
 Hence, the directors are held to a standard of reasonableness when
they deal with stated capital; they will be liable for reducing stated capital
contrary to statutory requirements only if they were negligent. 32 The credi-
tor, therefore, takes the risk that a director acting reasonably under the
circumstances may impair stated capital. When a shareholder is reasonable
in not knowing that the corporation has reduced stated capital in order to
repurchase his shares, the creditor should likewise be held to have taken
the risk of such an occurrence. There is no acceptable argument favoring the
application of a standard of reasonableness to the director while the recipi-
ent shareholder is made an insurer against an unauthorized capital impair-
ment. It is unrealistic to argue that the parties can easily be placed in their
original positions simply by taking the assets back from the shareholder
and returning the shares to him; the shareholder may have reinvested these
assets so that they are no longer readily available to him. It is also unrealis-
tic to characterize the selling shareholder as a mere donee of corporate assets
over whom the creditor must have priority. A repurchase is often a business
transaction which can be of substantial benefit to the corporation, particu-
larly as a vehicle for removing a strong shareholder who has been obstructing
management policy but who is willing to be bought out. If a move is made
to have the corporation buy the shareholder out, and if the latter acts reason-
23 •Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-44 (1964). For a similar provision in reference to the
receipt of illegal dividends, see W. Va. Code Ann. § 309 0 (1961), and in reference to
receipt of reduction surplus, see Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.41(6) (Supp. 1956).
29 See statutes cited notes 15-19 supra.
39 See statutes cited note 7 supra.
31 See, e.g., Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280,
43 N.E . 2d 43 (1942).
32 Sec statutes cited notes 22-25 supra.
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ably in accepting the corporate assets, the creditor should be held to have
taken the risk that this transaction might lead to a capital impairment.
The strict standard also ignores the distinction between a shareholder-
vendor in a large corporation and one in a close corporation. A strong argu-
ment can be made that a standard of liability should be flexible enough to
recognize a difference in the relative positions of a shareholder in a close cor-
poration, who is likely to be well informed, and a shareholder in a large
public corporation, who may have very little to do with the finances of the
business. A shareholder who knows, or under the circumstances should know,
that the corporation has impaired its capital in order to repurchase his shares
should be more disfavored in the eyes of the law than a shareholder who has
no chance of obtaining such knowledge and hence no reasonable opportunity
to put a stop to the transaction.
More importantly, it should be pointed out that a strict standard of
liability on the shareholder is not an effective method of deterring the evils
which the legislature is seeking to avoid. It is the director who is in the best
position to prevent a reduction of stated capital and the consequent dangers
of favoritism to insiders, creation of artificial market prices, and fraud on
creditors." The legislatures have felt that the best way to discourage the
director's participation in such a reduction is to impose a standard of negli-
gence on him." In analyzing ways to deter the director, it is relevant to
determine what effect the imposition of a given standard of liability on the
receiving shareholder will have on the director's actions. If there is a strict
standard on the shareholder and a right of contribution in the negligent
director against such shareholder, the director can almost always count on
having a substantial part of a judgment against him satisfied by the share-
holder. Such a situation is not likely to be as conducive to encouraging care
in the director's actions as would be the case if the director had a right of
contribution against the shareholder only when the latter was negligent in
receiving corporate assets, or indeed if the director had no right of contribu-
tion against the shareholder at all.
Since a strict standard of liability on the shareholder cannot be justified
in terms of its having a deterrent influence on the director, and further, since
it has been argued above that the nature of the creditor's risk does not de-
mand absolute assurance that stated capital will be unimpaired at all times,
the question remains whether a strict standard of liability on the shareholder
is justified as an adequate deterrent on the shareholder himself. It is sub-
mitted that the shareholder will not be substantially less careful in resell-
ing his shares if he is held to a test of reasonableness as opposed to a standard
of absolute liability. It should also be noted that the strict standard is likely
to discourage the shareholder from reselling his shares at all, and as indi-
cated above, such a reluctance is likely to deprive the corporation of an
effective method of eliminating a dissenting shareholder to the mutual satis-
faction of all parties.
33 See notes 2, 3 supra and accompanying text.
34 See statutes cited notes 22-25 supra.
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III. SHAREHOLDER'S LIABILITY BASED ON HIS KNOWLEDGE
A substantial number of states give the shareholder a complete defense
to an action against him for the illegal receipt of corporate assets through
a repurchase transaction: his ignorance of the illegality. The statute usually
first imposes liability on the director, and then gives him a right of contri-
bution against a shareholder if the latter knew that the distribution of assets
to him was illegal:
Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted . . . for the
. . . distribution of assets of a corporation and who shall be held
liable thereon, shall be entitled to contribution from the share-
holders who accepted or received any such . . . assets, knowing
such distribution to have been in violation of this act, in propor-
tion to the amounts received by them respectively."
Although such a statute correctly takes into consideration the shareholder's
state of mind, the liability of the director should be kept separate from that
of the shareholder, since entitling the director to have the shareholder con-
tribute to the payment of a judgment against him," does not encourage care
in the director and possibly encourages the opposite. A strong argument can
be made that the director will be more inclined to exercise care if he knows
that he alone will have to satisfy a judgment against him.
Some states subject the shareholder to a direct cause of action in addition
to liability through contribution. In Ohio, a shareholder who "knowingly"
receives an illegal distribution is directly liable to the corporations? and is
subject to the director's right of contribution." Similar provisions are found
in Connecticut, 39 North Carolina, 40 and Wisconsin. 41 Oklahoma also sub-
jects the shareholder to a direct cause of action; however, in addition to the
defense of ignorance, the statute gives the shareholder another way out. He
is liable "providing the corporation is adjudged insolvent or bankrupt
in any action or proceeding begun within two (2) years after such pur-
chase . . "42 California had the same section but for the existence of a one-
35 Alaska Stat. § 10.05.225 (1962). Accord, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-308 (Rep. 1966);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-14(7) (1963) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 5309-92 (1964) ; Tex.
Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.41(E) (1956) ; Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-44 (1953) ; Wyo. Stat.
Ann. 17-36.41 (1957).
36 Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 719 (d) (2) (McKinney 1963), giving the director
the right to have the corporation rescind the repurchase and recover for the benefit
of the director "the amount of such purchase price from any seller"; N.C. Gen. Stat. §
55-32(j) (1965), giving the director the right of "reimbursement or exoneration" from
the shareholder.
37 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.95(C) (1965).
38 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.95(D) (1965).
39 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-321 (b) (4), -359 (1958).
40 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-32(j), -54 (1965).
41 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.40(5) (a), (b) (1957). See Note, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 380.
42 Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 18, § 1.150 •(1953). Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.55 (1956) ;
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 45 (Supp. 1965) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-54 (1965) ; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 362 (1958). Pennsylvania removes the defense of ignorance if at
the time of the transaction (1) the corporation is insolvent, and (2) the net assets
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year limitation rather than two." The California provision was repealed
in 1945.44
 Apparently, the theory behind such a provision is that if the cor-
poration is insolvent, or nearly so, as a result of the repurchase, but yet has
a good chance of getting back on its feet within a relatively short period of
time, then the chances are slim that anyone will be hurt by the repurchase.
Hence, the time provision is inserted in the hope that the corporation will
be able to revive itself. The creditor is in effect told to wait one or two years
before suing.45
One of the most difficult problems in this area is the definition of "knowl-
edge." What state of mind is necessary before the selling shareholder is
liable? When the statute states that the shareholder is liable if he received
assets "knowing such ... distribution to have been in violation of this act,"4°
the statute clearly would include actual knowledge of the improper capital re-
duction. It is not clear, however, to what extent the statute applies to a
shareholder with less than actual knowledge. California tries to be somewhat
more explicit:
When a corporation, in violation of any provision of this division,
purchases directly or indirectly shares issued by it, ... any share-
have fallen below an amount sufficient to satisfy the preferential rights of shareholders
in the event of liquidation. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-707 (1958).
48 California presently has no time limitation. Cal. Corp. Code § 1715 (West 1955).
44 For the legislative history of this statute, see England v. Christensen, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 494-95, 52 Cal. Rptr. 402, 412-13 (1966).
45 Consideration must be given to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or
thereby will be rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to
his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without
a fair consideration.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-4 (1953). The state of mind of a selling shareholder is irrelevant
if, in fact, the corporation is insolvent at the time of the repurchase or is thereby rendered
insolvent. In fact, state of mind is irrelevant whenever the corporation is left with an
"unreasonably small capital":
Every conveyance made without fair consideration, when the person making it is
engaged, or is about to engage, in a business or transaction for which the property
remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors, and as to other persons who become creditors during
the continuance of such business or transaction, without regard to his actual
intent.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-5 (1953).
Clearly, a shareholder does not give "fair consideration" if the corporation is in-
solvent when he returns his shares to the corporation in exchange for the purchase price,
since the repurchased shares, whether subsequently retired or treated as treasury stock,
are hardly worth much to a corporation in such condition. However, the situation
is different if the corporation is only on the borderline of insolvency and has a rea-
sonable chance of reviving itself. The reacquired shares represent an "opportunity to ac-
quire new assets for the corporate treasury by creating new obligations." Borg v. Inter-
national Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1925). As such, they should be considered
valuable to the corporation (i.e., a "fair consideration") if there exists a reasonable
chance of creating the new obligations by reselling the shares purchased. It can also be
argued that a dissident shareholder who removes himself from the corporation by
reselling his shares has given something to the corporation by his very act of removal,
independent of the inherent value of the repurchased shares.
46 See statutes cited note 35 supra.
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holder ... who sells such shares with knowledge that the corporation
is the purchaser and with knowledge of facts indicating the impro-
priety of the purchase is liable to the corporation . . . . 47
New York48
 and Oklahoma" have similar provisions.
It is unclear why the statute includes a provision that a shareholder
must know that his own corporation is purchasing his shares. If the share-
holder knows that he has received a distribution of assets which is illegal
because an improper reduction of capital occurred, would he not also know
that his own corporation was the purchaser? It is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which the shareholder would know the former fact but not the
latter. An unlikely possibility is the situation of a shareholder selling his
shares on the open market where the broker informs the shareholder that he
has a corporate buyer who is willing to reduce its stated capital in order to
make the purchase. If this shareholder knows that such a corporation exists,
but does not know that the corporation is his own, does he nevertheless have
knowledge of a fact "indicating the impropriety" under the California
statute?
The latter question raises the further problem of determining to whom
the fact must indicate the impropriety: to a particular shareholder or to a
reasonable shareholder under the circumstances? In the recent case of England
v. Christensen," the California court refused to consider whether the selling
shareholders had actual knowledge of the impropriety. "Their state of mind
as to the impropriety of the transaction was immaterial since knowing the
facts they were chargeable with knowledge that the law prohibited the trans-
action."51
 In view of the circumstances of that case, it could be "inferred"
that the shareholders had the requisite knowledge to make them liable under
the statute. 52 Hence the court is applying a reasonableness standard: as
reasonable shareholders they should have known of the impropriety.
The court insisted that the rule adopted was not the equivalent of a
rule requiring proof that the shareholders had actual knowledge of the im-
propriety itself. If, however, a shareholder knows a particular fact which in-
dicates an impropriety, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he knows
in some degree the impropriety itself. The statute does not say "knowledge
of events which in fact are improper"; rather, the statute seems to require
knowledge of events indicating an impropriety to this shareholder or to a
reasonable shareholder. It is arguable that the knowledge requirement can
be separated into two parts: knowledge of the fact, and knowledge of the
indications stemming from that fact.
In Pennsylvania, a shareholder will not be liable "unless he knew or
should have known from facts within his own knowledge of the illegality of
such . . . distribution at the time of his receipt thereof." 53 This formulation
47 Cal. Corp. Code § 1715 (West 1955).
48 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 719(d) (2) (McKinney 1963).
49 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1.149 (1953). But see § 1.150 of the same title.
30
 243 Cal. App. 2d 478, 52 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1966).
51 Id. at 497, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
32
 Ibid.
33 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-707 (1958).
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makes it clear that actual knowledge of the impropriety is, not needed. How-
ever, the statute refers only to facts actually within the shareholder's "own
knowledge," and does not seem to include facts of which the .shareholder
should have been aware.
A distinction should be made among the following situations: (1) where
there is actual knowledge of a fact, (2) where, under the circumstances,
there should have been knowledge of that fact, (3) where there is actual
knowledge that the fact can be characterized as improper, and (4) where,
under the circumstances, there should have been knowledge that' the fact
can be characterized as improper. A provision which takes into account all
four situations is the following: . .
No shareholder shall be liable unless he had knowledge of facts, or
should have had knowledge of facts, which indicated the impropriety
of the distribution, or should have indicated such impropriety, at
the time of said purchase.
Suppose a shareholder, desirous of selling his stock to the corporation, knows
that six months ago the directors were contemplating bankruptcy; or suppose
that in view of the shareholder's dealings with the directors, he should have
known of this contemplated action. As a reasonable shareholder, he should
know that the corporation might reduce its stated capital in order to make
the purchase six months later. Not knowing the intricacies of the corporate
balance sheet, the shareholder may not know the exact moment when the
capital is reduced, i.e., he may not have actual knowledge of the impropriety.
However, he has knowledge, or should have knowledge, of a fact which should
indicate an impropriety to him. If he had no actual knowledge of the con-
templated bankruptcy, he may not be liable under the Pennsylvania statute
even though he should have known of this fact. If he had actual knowledge
of the contemplated bankruptcy, but had no actual knowledge that a re-
purchase in such circumstances would be improper, he may not be liable
under the California statute, even though he should have known that it would
be improper. In both of the latter hypotheticaIs, however, the shareholder
would be liable under the formulation suggested above.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the following statutory proposal best accommodates
both the need to discourage the dangers incident to a corporate repurchase
out of stated capital, and the desire not to impose on the shareholder an un-
necessarily burdensome liability.
LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDER RESELLING HIS SHARES TO THE CORPORATION
A. When a corporation purchases its own shares in violation of this
Act or of the restrictions in the articles of incorporation, a share-
holder who accepts or receives any distribution in pursuance
thereof shall be liable to the corporation for the amount so ac-
cepted or received, provided, that said corporation is adjudged
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insolvent or bankrupt in any action or proceeding begun within
one (1) year after such purchase.
B. If the corporation is not adjudged insolvent or bankrupt within
one (1) year after said purchase, a shareholder who accepts or
receives any distribution in pursuance thereof shall be liable to
the corporation for the amount so accepted or received, provided
that said shareholder had knowledge of facts, or should have had
knowledge of facts which indicated the impropriety of the distri-
bution, or should have indicated an impropriety, at the time of
said purchase.
C. A director liable under this Act shall have no right of contribu-
tion against the shareholder.
It should be noted that since the director is normally liable for a
willful or negligent distribution of corporate assets in violation of the re-
purchase provisions, the corporation under the proposed statute might ob-
tain a double recovery—one from the director and one from the shareholder.
This is not considered undesirable, however, since the main objective of the
liability statute is not simply to return the parties to their initial positions
before the repurchase, but to encourage the use of care in a repurchase trans-
action so as to minimize the dangers which could result. For the same rea-
son, the proposed provisions do not provide contribution for the director
against the shareholder.
RICHARD K. COLE
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